Confusion reigned at Dubrovka.  I immediately contacted police officers, who naturally ‘sent me packing’ and requested that I not bother them with my information. After this, I contacted S. V. Yastrzhembsky, who was the Russian president’s representative and in charge at Dubrovka during those hours.  He permitted me to remain within the cordon that the police and military officers were setting up around the scene, and briefed me every half-hour about whatever he knew. Once, right in from of my very own eyes, his assistant asked him what they should tell the media.  Yastrzhembsky answered: «Tell them that the Chechens demand money.»  Within a half-hour, radio station Echo of Moscow, TV station NTV, and other media outlets transmitted this information into ether.  Thus the disinformation campaign was born.

About a half-hour later, Yastrzhembsky went up to some members of the press, and promised to tell them frankly all that was going on.  A site was designated for a meeting, in an apartment’s courtyard just outside the cordoned off area.

At this time, THEY SHUT OFF ALL MOBILE PHONE COMMUNICATIONS AT DUBROVKA! When journalists asked why they had cut off all mobile phone communications, S. V. Yastrzhembsky smiled, and joked maliciously: “Your cell phones don’t work?  That’s strange, mine work.”  Why the special services found it necessary to shut off all the cell phones is not understood. So that no one could contact those who were inside the seized theater?

Communications were restored after two or three hours, and my wife was able to contact me a second time. She and my son gave me information on the number of foreign hostages, which I gave to representatives of the foreign press and the Dutch embassy. All journalists, other than representatives from the television station ORT, who were probably otherwise informed) arrived at the spot Yastrzhembsky had designated for his press conference, and at the assigned time.  The conference did not take place, however.  Yastrzhembsky gave an interview to journalists from ORT in a different location.  The other reporters had been tricked into leaving the cordon, and were never allowed back inside.  After this, representatives of the media were no longer right next to ‘Nord-Ost’; the building was now outside their line of sight.

By midnight the generals had arrived, and they did not talk to Yastrzhembsky at all.  He was assigned, probably, another duty — the role of ‘dezinformator’, the purveyor of disinformation.  It easy to see that, from the very beginning, the military and secret services were preparing something which the rest of us had no need to know about, and without attempting to establish contact with the hostages.  I figured out that from the night of October 23–24 onward, Yastrzhembsky knew nothing, and was not going to help in any way, besides in the spread of disinformation. I began to look for Dutch journalists, and tried to contact the embassy.

My brother, who at that time worked for FAPSI, the federal government’s communications and communications intelligence agency, helped me contact the staff of the ‘Alpha’ anti-terrorism force.  They advised me to call Natalya and Dima (Dmitry), and tell them that they should mention the name of that special force’s operational planning commander, assuring me that Natasha and Dima would be left alone after that. I immediately understood what this could lead to. If they had done this, then Natasha and Dima would have been the first to be shot by the terrorists, and this was probably what ‘Alpha’ wanted in the first place.  After this, I no longer tried to contact ‘Alpha’, Yastrzhembsky, or any other of the authorities, and left the cordon.

October 24^th was a terrible day. First, they broke off the negotiations. Yastrzhembsky was keeping some foreign diplomats in a building commandeered expressly for this purpose.  They were expecting negotiations, and Yastrzhembsky would not allow them to accept information from hostages or their relatives, or even the terrorists, who themselves were attempting to release some hostages on the morning on the 24^th.  The terrorists had made a new demand – if relatives of the hostages were to hold a demonstration on Red Square, then they would release the children.  The government did not permit it. OMON paramilitaries used rifle butts to chase away grandmothers and grandfathers, who were holding up signs with the tears on the eyes.  I was overcome with fury and malice.

On the morning of the 24^th, strictly by chance, I met Zaur Talhigov near the Dubrovka building.  We started up a conversation, in the course of which I learned that Talhigov was a Chechen, and knew Barayev.  He had gone to the Dubrovka building at the request of the Moscow Chechen community, with no official pass, papers, money, etc., guided only by the desire, in his words: “To render assistance in contacting the terrorists in order to get the hostages released.” 

Contact was established after awhile, and I spoke with Zaur about getting my wife and son released. I asked him repeatedly: “Zaur, please, let’s think of something, anything.  I’m ready to take my wife’s or my son’s place.”  Zaur said that he would do it.  A woman journalist ran up to us at this time: “Zaur, a phone call for you.  It’s the FSB duty officer.  The FSB staff duty officer is calling.”  So they invited him into the headquarters.  I personally accompanied him to the police cordon, and saw someone come out from the headquarters and conduct him into the building.

Talhigov was now the center of attention. The Russian politicians Yavlinsky, Nemtsov, Kobzon, etc., together with senior FSB officers, representatives of the government, and foreign journalists, used Zaur as a mediator in negotiations.  Many thought he was from the FSB.  In reality, though, all he could do was call the hostage-takers by phone.  I contacted Zaur regularly, and was interested in the state of affairs.  There were no changes, however.

Talhigov and I stayed up together on the night of October 24–25. At one point, he said he needed to go to an Internet cafe on the Manezh.  I asked him how he would get there without papers. "(FSB chief) Patrushev signed this paper for me, no cop will arrest me,” he replied.  “But since there’s no money, I’ll have to go on foot.”  I offered him money for a taxi, but he said:  “I won’t take any from you.  Because then you’ll think I’m helping you for the money.”  “You fool,” I said.  “You’re the only one who can do anything about his situation.  I’m afraid to let you out of my sight.”  Nevertheless, I managed to persuade him to take some money for a taxi, and he returned within an hour.  We spent a sleepless night together in conversation, about how to help the hostages.  

I asked him again: “How can we contact Barayev?”  Talhigov looked straight at me, and said: “You know, Oleg, they are very devout Moslems. They won’t do anything bad to the hostages. I think they have a different use for them. But they don’t trust me. They think I’m from the FSB, so they don’t speak openly with me.”

Then I got an idea. I called up my wife again. It asked her to get one of the gunmen.  I said that a Chechen wanted to speak with them. My son later told me that a masked terrorist came up, took the phone, and went to a corner of the music hall.  He spoke with Talhigov in the Chechen language for a long time. The Chechen even tried to give the phone to Barayev, but Barayev refused.

As soon as we had finished, someone called back on the very same cell phone: “Oh, will you will excuse me. I’m a Russian journalist, I dialed the wrong number.”  How, I wondered, did a Russian journalist get my private Dutch telephone number??? As it later turned out, from this moment on my telephone was under surveillance.

Natasha then called.  “Oleg, they reseated us into the first row, and they said that if the Dutch ambassador comes tomorrow morning at nine, with journalists, then they will let us go.”  After discussing this with Dutch journalists and the political adviser from the Dutch embassy, I again called Natasha’s number.  A Chechen answered.  From that point on, the Chechens had my wife’s phone, and Zaur discussed the details of my family’s release with them.

On the morning of the 25^th, the diplomats arrived again. Yastrzhembsky told them that the foreigners would be released all at once.  This was not the truth, since Barayev had said that embassy officials could only take citizens from their own country.

The government once again was exploiting disinformation. Someone did not want foreign hostages released. When, later in the day, the diplomats had left, representatives from the Ukrainian government contacted Zaur.  They said that they were told to obtain the release of Ukrainian hostages from Barayev though Zaur.  By midday, Zaur got the terrorists to agree to release the Ukrainian hostages.  After awhile, I asked to speak with Barayev, to discuss the details of the release with him.  I was going to promise that he could give my wife a message to send to the Dutch information agency RUSNET, which they could report to the outside world. 

I dialed Natasha’s number and, to my surprise, she picked up the phone.  It was our last conversation. At the time I thought they would soon be released.  She gave the phone to the Chechens, and I gave mine to Zaur, and he talked at great length.  I remember that he slipped a few Russian words in among the Chechen he was speaking: OMON, snipers, BTR armored cars, and so on.  Everything he was saying, however, could clearly be seen by anyone standing there at Dubrovka.

Soon after this conversation, Zaur was arrested.  All negotiations concerning the release of the hostages ceased at the time of his arrest, and the FSB conducted negotiations directly with the terrorists.

Zaur and I had twice negotiated the release of foreign hostages, and the ambassadors had arrived. They were taken to a separate building where they sat and waited, and then Yastrzhembsky told the diplomats that Barayev allegedly would not negotiate. This had absolutely no basis in reality, because Barayev had personally requested of Zaur: "Let the ambassador of Holland come, and I will free the Dutch. Other ambassadors come, I’ll let others go.” Someone greatly desired that the foreign hostages no be released, and so they arrested Zaur, shut down the negotiations, and conducted an assault.

Later, speaking as the main witness at Zaur’s trial, I described his efforts. According to the prosecutor, the FSB, ironically had only one recording of Zaur’s telephone conversations, and it was precisely that one in which he spoke about the disposition of the OMON officers, the BTR armored cars, and the special forces. All Zaur’s other telephone negotiations concerning the release of the hostages, according the FSB, had been destroyed. Proving Zaur’s innocence proved impossible, and he was sentenced to 7 years in prison.

On the morning of October 26^th, I found my son Dima quickly.  Natasha, even though I turned half of Moscow on its head, could not be located.  At 9 AM, no foreign hostages had died, officially.  No tally was provided for a long time.  On the night of October 26–27, I again turned to my brother, who worked for FAPSI.  He and a college friend of his, who worked in the operational headquarters of ‘Alpha’, starting looking for my wife, since they had access to those places usually closed to the public.  Through their efforts, Natasha was located in the morgue of one of Moscow’s hospitals. 

Abusing by his authority, my brother talked FSB officers at the hospital into letting us in. Accompanied by the Dutch ambassador and his political adviser, I arrived at the hospital at 8 A.M. on the 27^th.  By then, however, Natasha’s body had had been transported to the Botkin Hospital.  On the way to this hospital, while listening to the radio, we learned that the corpse of the first foreigner known to have died at Dubrovka had been identified – Natalya Zhirova.  FSB officers were waiting for us at Botkin, and told me that if I wanted to have Natasha released for burial quickly, I must not ask too many questions.  I agreed.  According to the coroner’s report, Natasha died in the theater hall.  It was later determined she had passed away at the hospital without receiving any medical attention.

For his part in assisting in the search for my wife, my brother was fired from his job at FAPSI.

After the assault, two young investigators questioned me.  One was from the FSB, and the other from the district attorney’s office.  They only wrote down that which they found useful to themselves. I told them at the time that they were doing nothing useful.  They tried to bring me in for questioning once again, but, after consulting with my embassy, I refused.

I have never received an official letter, or condolences, from either the Russian government or the Russian embassy. When colleagues from the Dutch company, where my wife worked as engineer, tried to attend her funeral in Moscow, the Russian embassy would not grant them a visa.  It was only at the last minute, when her colleagues had threatened to sic the Dutch press on the embassy, that visas were granted.

While I was participating in Zaur’s trial, the Russian embassy rejected my entrance visa as well, and did not grant one until NTV, and the Russian and Dutch press reported: “The chief witness cannot get a visa.”

I later participated in other ‘Nord-Ost’ trials. Twice I was served with subpoenas. The court consequently refused to compensate me for the expenditures connected with my trips to Russia to participate in these sessions. This judicial lawlessness is but another example of what is going on with the ‘Nord-Ost’ affair in Russia.

I personally wrote this text on January 19^th, 2006.