APPENDIX 17. Explanations given by medical personnel who participated in the evacuation of the victims on October 26, 2002 (from materials of the criminal case)

From the statement by O. V. Belyakova (case volume 120, page 130):

We got to Melnikov Street about 07–15.  On arrival at the DK (Palace of Culture) of Moscow Bearings, Inc., two victims were loaded into our vehicle.   MChS (Emergencies Ministry) workers did the loading.  Literally a minute afterwards an MChS worker told me to get into a bus and provide help to the victims inside it.

When I entered the bus, the doors shut, and the MChS worker ordered the driver to go to GKB (City Clinical Hospital) #1.  There were no medicines or medical instruments on the bus.  While in route, the bus was stopping at the lights, and upon arrival at GKB #1 the security guards at first would not permit us to enter.  There were 22 victims on the bus, one of whom was dying at that moment.  The victims were arranged chaotically: some sat in the bus seats, while others were on the floor.

I do not know who was in charge of the evacuation work.  I also do not know who carried out the victims.

There was no sorting on the square, and this played a negative role.  The victims were sent to the hospital on the buses without the required number of medical personnel, medicines and medical equipment, and this played a negative role.

What would have helped our work would have been the name of the antidote.

From the statement by Puchkova (case volume 120, page 99):

I was personally not at Melnikov Street on October 26^th, 2002, and so I do not know the details as to how the provision of medical assistance to the former hostages was organized.

As far as the coordination and cooperation between the various services and timely placement of the victims, or the necessity to bring in military medics, I cannot say anything since I was personally not present at the scene.

From the statement by A. M. Karaush (case volume 120, page 101):

On October 26^th, 2002, I went to the DK of Moscow Bearings, Inc. as part of brigade 16, squad 786353.  The drive to the site was from 13–55 to 16–00.  I would like to explain that I did not take part in providing medical assistance to the former hostages.  It was necessary to evacuate a male victim with gunshot wounds.  Since the urgent medical assistance to him had already been performed, we merely transported the patient to the City Hospital #20.  The law enforcement personnel suspected that the indicated individual belonged to the group of individuals that had seized the DK, and so he was evacuated accompanied by two policemen.

Since I arrived at  Melnikov Street on October 26^th, 2002, after everyone had already received medical assistance and was evacuated, I do not know anything about the organization of medical assistance and evacuation.

From the statement by T. N. Krainova  (case volume 120, page 100):

At 05–30 I went to the DK on Melnikov Street with brigade 16, squad 784261.  My brigade was ordered to provide assistance and evacuate two FSB personnel who had taken part in the special operation to free the hostages and had been exposed to the action of the gas.  One of them was in mildly serious condition, while the other was close to satisfactory.  We provided (the patients with) urgent care in the form of oxygen therapy and glucose injections, and then hospitalized them at GKB #33.

I would like to mention that I was not able to observe the course of the victims’ evacuation, since I was assisting my patients.  As far as the presence or absence of a leader/coordinator among the number of medical workers by the exit to the DK building, I cannot say, since I do not have that information.  I would like to mention that in my opinion the number of medical personnel accompanying the victims on the buses should have been increased.

From the statement by A. V. Nedoseikina (case volume 120, page 115):

I received no prior warning that I would be used to transport former hostages from the DK of Moscow Bearings, Inc.

As squad 784548, we took a victim to the Botkin hospital in a state of clinical death.

The evacuation of the former hostages from the DK of Moscow Bearings, Inc. was inadequately organized.  In part, there was poor sorting of the sick: dead bodies were loaded into ambulances while live hostages were in buses, mixed in with the corpses of other dead hostages.

The buses carrying victims for the most part were without medical personnel, and this played a negative role in their rescue.

The absence of information about the name of the substance used in the course of the special operation played a negative role in the provision of medical assistance.

From the statement by D. N. Osipov (case volume 120, page 118):

I found out from the dispatcher that I might by activated to transport former hostages from the DK when I was put into a squad at 07–56 on October 26^th, 2002.  Earlier I had no idea that I could be activated to perform my duties.  The message with the work organization to evacuate hostages from the DK, the character of the medical assistance needed, and the necessity of using special methods and medicines for first aid, was not received in a timely fashion.  There were no special instructions.

At about 08–30 the brigade drove to the DK, but I provided no medical assistance, since there was no order given.  At 09–00, by order of the TsEhMP (Russian emergency center), I was released back to the substation.

I do not know how the evacuation of the former hostages from the DK was organized.  I saw however that the evacuation from the theater foyer was conducted by soldiers, then a group from the MChS carried them to the front steps and distributed them among the “03’s” (911 ambulances) and buses without a preliminary sorting.  I did not notice a specific leader for the work.  A large number of the former hostages were in an unconscious state.

I think that the main deficiency in the provision of medical assistance was the absence of organization and sorting.  I cannot name those persons who are responsible for this deficiency.

I have no data on the transportation of the victims since I did not witness it.  I believe that the absence of military specialists played a negative role.

From the statement by L. O. Safronova (case volume 120, page 122):

At about 05–00 I received a call to go to Melnikov Street, to the DK of Moscow Bearings, Inc.  The first call went out to the Sklifosovsky Institute and our brigade (#35) with three others from our substation arrived at the institute at 05–15 and then immediately went to Melnikov Street.  We received no prior warning that we might have to go and provide assistance to the former hostages.  There was also no prior information about the order of the organization of the evacuation of the victims, about the character of the medical assistance that may be needed by the hostages, or about the necessity to use special methods to provide assistance.  Once our vehicle arrived at the DK, two workers from some emergency agency dragged a victim into the vehicle, and then they sat a girl of about 15 inside as well.  They did not say anything about the character of the substance that victims may be under the influence of, nor which hospital to bring them to.  In the end we drove to GKB #23, since I knew where it was located.  The first victim had no signs of life.  The girl was conscious and we gave her a glucose injection.

The organization of assistance to the victims and their evacuation was, in my opinion, unsatisfactory.  This, in part, is proven by our brigade’s experience.  Whoever it was who was in charge of the work and carried responsibility for its (poor) results, is unknown to me.

I did not know what substance was used in the course of the special operation, and so I did not use any type of special drugs or methods to provide assistance to the victims.  In my opinion, a number of factors played a negative role in the provision of assistance to the victims.  In part, there was no coordination or cooperation between the various special and emergency services.  I do not know anything about the transport of victims on the buses – I did not take part in that.  In our case, the evacuation routes for the victims were not shown to us.

From the statement by M. Y. Zakharenkov (case volume 120, page 124):

I received no prior notification about the possibility of having to provide medical assistance to the victims at the DK of Moscow Bearings, Inc. At about 0530 the call came in and I went with my ambulance brigade (08/1) to the Sklifosovsky Emergency Institute, and from there we went in a column to Melnikov Street, where we arrived at about 07–00.

On arriving we immediately began to provide medical assistance to a woman who was put into our vehicle.  She was in serious condition, and resembled someone who had overdosed on opiates.

Immediately after this an unidentified medical worker walked up to me and gave me 6 ampoules of nalaxon with syringes, then I went to a bus where there were victims.  There were 17 victims in the bus, and of these 4 were already showing no signs of life.  In route to GKB #7 (my brigade’s vehicle was following behind the bus) I provided assistance via injections of nalaxon to those victims who needed it most.

Relative to the general organization of aid to the victims, the presence or absence of a coordinator at the exit of the DK, and coordination and cooperation between the various emergency services, I cannot say a thing, because I could not see a general picture of what went on.

I can comment on the mass evacuation of victims on buses without the necessary number of medical personnel – this beyond a doubt played a negative role.   It needed to be clearly stated that nalaxon was needed to assist to the victims, and to have provided it in adequate quantities.

From the statement by E. G. Larin (case volume 120, page 125):

I found out from the substation dispatcher that I would be activated to provide assistance to the hostages at 05–00 on October 26^th, 2002.  Information on the character of the injuries and the necessary medicines was not received in time.  At 07–00 we arrived on the scene as part of a medical brigade.  Later, MChS workers loaded an unconscious female victim into our vehicle.  She was given all necessary aid and was hospitalized at GKB #7.

Who it was that participated in and commanded the evacuation from the building is unknown to me.  Timely information about the substance or components of the substance was not received, so we treated the symptoms as they arose.  Coordination and organization of the medical sorting (triage) of the sick was not performed, and no one led the ambulance brigades.  The absence of a leader played a negative role.  There was enough room to accommodate the victims in front of the DK, although it was not equipped as is the norm for medical catastrophes.

Transport using buses played a negative role, since there was an absence of medical workers and necessary equipment and medicines.

Information about the components of the gas could have been helpful in organizing assistance, since the ambulance brigades would have known the necessary antidote.

From the statement by V. V. Gorbunov (case volume 120, page 126):

I found out that I would be activated to provide assistance to the hostages at 06–15 on October 26^th, simultaneous with the call to go to the scene.  I received no timely information about the character of the injuries and the necessary medicines.  We drove to the scene as part of a brigade.  MChS workers there had started to load sick people onto our stretchers in the square in front of the DK building of Moscow Bearings, Inc.  The victims on visual examination showed no signs of life.  My objection, that it was not worth loading a corpse into my ambulance, was answered with ‘she has been injected, so she should be alive’.  My question as to what happened in the building and what kind of injection she had been given received no reply.

At the same time, a different pair of MChS workers put another female victim into the front of our vehicle.  I was unable to ask them anything before they left.  The second female was in serious condition: pale complexion with weak, interrupted breathing, and unresponsive.  I ordered the driver to head down Volgograd Highway, and find the TsEhMP (emergency services) vehicle or some type of a distribution or a sorting point in order to find out where we should send the victims.  We found no such point, however.  At this same time, I had examined the patient on the stretcher and determined that she was dead.  The second victim, due to the unknown character of her injuries, was given oxygen via a breathing mask.  The patient regained consciousness.

The absence of a sorting point played a negative role.

I did not see any victims on buses.

From the statement by L. N. Sushnikova (case volume 120, page 119):

At 07–30 on October 26^th, 2002, I received from the dispatcher orders to go to the DK of Moscow Bearings, Inc. on #7 Melnikov Street as part of brigade #23, in order to provide medical assistance to victims.  No one reported a thing about the assault on the building, or what type of gas was used in the assault.  I found out about the assault while listening to the news before we drove away.

On reaching the DK building, a girl was immediately loaded into our vehicle.  She was in a coma.  Rescue personnel loaded her into the vehicle and they ordered us to take her to intensive care.  We took the victim to GKB #53.  In route we did not provide any assistance to the victim, since she already had a tracheal tube in place and did not need any other help.  At the hospital she was sent to intensive care.

I do not know how the evacuation of the hostages was organized.  Our brigade got to the building unhindered.  I do not know who was in charge of the calls.  We did not know where to take them; we just got behind the lead ambulance and arrived at GKB #53.  We had no radio in our vehicle.  We returned to the substation after GKB #53.

Since we left right away, I did not see a leader-coordinator by the DK building among the medical workers.

From the statement by E. V. Konyahin (case volume 120, page 116):

Our possible activation to transport victim hostages from the DK was made known to us from the substation administrator.  There was nothing about our time of activation, or about the organization or the character of the medical assistance, or the necessity to use special methods to provide medical assistance.  There was no information about medicines.  There was no briefing.

Squad 784553 arrived at the DK on October 26^th, 2002.  A man’s corpse was carried into the vehicle.  When I asked why a corpse was being loaded, they said that it was none of my business.  The corpse was taken to the morgue at GKB #13, where an employee from TsEhMP #407 gave us further orders.  Considering that there was no need to provide assistance to a corpse, I decided to help the victims who were transported in the buses.

In my opinion, there was no organization to the evacuation of the former hostages.

I do not know about the presence of a coordinator.

I do not know about the presence of an area (for triage).

The buses with victims, for the most part, did not have accompanying medical personnel and this played a negative role.  The absence of information about the substance used during the course of the (special) operation also played its own negative role.

I do not know about cooperation of the special subunits.

I would like to add that my assistance at GKB #13 consisted of transporting the sick and the dead from the buses into the premises of the reception ward.

From the statement by G. I. Kruglova (case volume 120, page 108):

On October 26^th at 07–20 a lot of brigades in our region, including our own, were called to the region of the DK of Moscow Bearings, Inc. to provide assistance.  Until we arrived on the scene we did not know what had happened at the DK.  On arriving on the scene of the square in front of the DK, we saw a line of ‘03’ vehicles (911 ambulances) and we drove to the end of the line.  When our turn came workers from some sort of organization unknown to us opened the back hatch and literally tossed inside two victims in serious condition.   When we asked where to bring them they told us wherever we wanted.  I do not know who was in charge of he operation.  Both victims were in a deep narcotic sleep (a comatose condition) and we had no idea how the sick ended up this way. Our sick were transported to City Hospital #13 where a large number of victims had also been transported.  There were no gurneys (since the sick could not move on their own), so there was a delay.  While waiting we observed a bus arrive with victims.  Some were able to walk on their own, and policemen dragged others out by their arms and legs.

From the statement by V. V. Federov (case volume 120, page 102):

At about 06–20 on October 26^th, 2002, our brigade was sent to the DK on #7 Melnikov Street in order to assist victims after the hostage rescue operation.  At about 1 am the night before they told us that there would be an assault.  The dispatcher reported this.

Two victims were placed into our vehicle, while I was put on a bus full of victims.  There were about 40 victims on the bus.  At that time a representative of the TsEhMP gave me 10 ampoules of nalaxon.  I do not know what assistance they (the victims) received before being put on the bus.

The people who were doing the sorting should have only put on the buses those who did not need intensive therapy.  There were victims in various levels of seriousness on the bus.

From the statement by T. P. Troperina (case volume 120, page 104):

On October 26^th, 2002, at about 05–20 the order came from the TsEhMP for all brigades to arrive at the DK on #7 Melnikov Street, in order to assist the hostages.

No one reported what assistance that the victims would need beforehand, but we were ready to provide any kind of assistance.

Upon arrival at the DK an interior ministry worker ran up from the back of our vehicle with a girl in his arms.  The victim was in serious condition.  Judging from her external condition, I concluded that she had been poisoned with some sort of gas.  After providing assistance, we transported the victim to GKB #13.  Once there we took part in the unloading of victims from the arriving buses, then on orders of the TsEhMP we again returned to the DK building.  Afterwards, on their orders, we returned to the substation.  We carried no other hostages.  As far as how the evacuation was organized, and who was in charge, I do not know.

Victims should have been carried on ambulances, and not on buses, or at least those in the most serious condition.

From the statement by Y. K. Volkov (case volume 120, pages 67-68):

At 05–50 on October 26^th I was in the TsEhMP building and got a call from the dispatcher to go to Volgograd Prospect and join a column of ambulances.  I received no warning beforehand that I might have to perform my duties at the DK building of Moscow Bearings, Inc.   After getting the call, no one informed me about the situation (at the DK).  At about 07–05 or 07–10 I got an order from A. P. Seltskovsky, which was transmitted to me via my colleague, Evgeny Krugovoi, to go to the DK building as part of a column.  I arrived there at 07–13.

There was no timely information about the order of work to evacuate the hostages from the DK building and there were no instructions as to whether I was to act according to a pre-determined algorithm.

At the moment of my arrival the evacuation work was already organized: MChS workers, search and rescue teams, soldiers, the police, and other people, had carried out the victims and laid them down on the square in front of the DK, or carried them to the buses in front of the building, after which the ambulances followed the buses and headed to the hospitals.  I would like to add that the buses full of victims were not equipped with ambulance service workers or employees of the TsEhMP, in accordance with the wishes of the headquarters and A. P. Seltskovsky.

The initial sorting of victims was to be done by TsEhMP workers, but the absence of space for arrangement of the victims, the absence of the organization of timely, unhindered, and uninterrupted ambulance and bus traffic, as well as the absence of preliminary information about the results of the assault, made things extremely difficult.  An awful lot of problems had to be solved on the spot.

The absence of space for temporary arrangement of the victims with the ability to resuscitate them on the spot using personnel from the several (medical) brigades present, the absence of the organization of unhindered and uninterrupted ambulance and bus traffic, the mass transportation of victims on buses without the required number of accompanying physicians, medics, and rescuers, as well as the absence of information about the name of the substance that was used during the course of the special operation, all these played a negative role.  The reason for these deficiencies, I believe, was a failure to foresee the consequences of the assault.

From the statement by E. A. Krugovoi (case volume 120, pages 65-66):

I was not warned about the beginning of the assault, or that I might have to carry out my duties, beforehand.  At 05–37 on October 26^th, 2002, the first shots sounded, and at 05–50 I sent my ambulance brigade to the scene without waiting for orders.  I reconnoitered the avenues of approach together with Y. K. Volkov.  At 07–02, on orders of A. P. Seltskovsky, we drove to the DK of Moscow Bearings, Inc. located at #7 Melnikov Street, Moscow, where we arrived at 07–05.  After arrival at the DK building, we saw that the evacuation of the former hostages had already been organized as follows: MChS workers, firemen, policemen, and other persons, carried out the victims and placed them on the steps of the DK building.

I loaded victims into buses that were the first to arrive at the DK.  In such a manner I sent off 2 or 3 buses.  How many victims were in the buses, I cannot say precisely.  I loaded buses depending on the level (of the patient’s) seriousness: those who could breathe on their own I placed in seats in the front.  Those whose breathing passages were impeded we laid on the floor.

Clinically the victims looked to me as if opium-based drugs had poisoned them.

The victims were to be sent to hospitals depending on their level of seriousness and the distance to the hospital, and in this regard the buses I filled were sent to GKB #13.

At 07–26 a child in extremely grave condition was put into my vehicle, and he required immediate, emergency medical assistance.

I believe that the absence of routes for transport traffic played a negative role in the evacuation of the hostages.

Several corpses were placed in buses that I filled.

From the statement by A. P. Nezamayev (case volume 120, pages 63-64):

At about 2 in the morning of October 26^th, 2002, information came from A. P. Seltskovsky at the DK building of Moscow Bearings, Inc.

Together with the chairman of the health committee and some FSB officers, we collected two physicians who agreed to evacuate the wounded hostages who were removed from the DK building and put into operating rooms at GBB #1.

At 05–45 on October 26^th, 2002, information came from A. P. Seltskovsky that the assault had begun, and I ordered 20 ambulance brigades assembled on Volgograd Prospect.

At about 6 am A. P. Seltskovsky reported that the DK building had been freed from the terrorists, and I moved to the DK building with medical forces comprising 5 ambulance brigades.  The drive to the DK building was impeded because panel trucks used to cordon off the road had not been driven away in time, and in the square in front of the DK were a lot of privately owned vehicles.

Upon arriving on the scene, I saw that law enforcement officers, firemen, rescue services, and other people, had carried the victims out from the DK building and taken them to GBB #1.  I managed to intercept some of the victims and began their distribution among the ambulance brigades.

Many of the victims were in a comatose state.  All this indicated gas poisoning.

In my opinion injections with nalaxon played little role.

From the statement by L. G. Kostomarova (case volume 120, pages 60-62):

On October 26^th the Center received a report about two hostages with gunshot wounds (this was about 0330).

At 05–37 the order came to place 100 ambulance brigades from the nearest substations in reserve.  At 0550 information arrived about the assault on the DK by special services soldiers.  At 07–02 brigade 68/3 together with ambulance brigades under the command of headquarters began moving to the DK.  From 07–00 to 07–05 the mass evacuation of hostages by ambulance and bus with accompanying medical personnel began.  I wish to mention that, according to my data, the movement of ambulance brigades between the Proletarskaya metro station and the DK was impeded.  At 08–15 the evacuation of the hostages was complete.

I would like to clarify that the character of the assistance, which the victims required, or more precisely, what was needed after the assault of October 26^th, was not made known to me.  The preparations for assistance were mainly aimed at gunshot wounds and injuries from explosives.

I would like to mention that nalaxon is not an antidote in and of itself.  Nalaxon is an antagonist against various narcotic substances.

I was not located in the immediate vicinity of the events on October 26^th.

From the statement by V. Y. Fedosov (case volume 120, page 106):

I was at the watch station at 06–30 on October 26^th, 2002, when the command came from the dispatcher to get ready to go to the scene of an event at #7 Melnikov Street, to the DK of Moscow Bearings, Inc. and provide assistance to victims, and transport them to hospitals.  I was told nothing as to how the assistance on the scene would be organized.  The character of the medical assistance that we would provide the hostages, the necessity for using special methods or medications to provide this assistance, this information was not provided to me, either.

Our brigade assisted two victims.  Both patients were in serious condition.  At about 08–00 one victim was carried to our vehicle, and in the course of a minute they brought yet another.  We placed them in the vehicle and took them to GKB #7.  The transport of the victims was performed by police officers.  I did not see how the provision of assistance to the hostages was organized near the entrance to the DK.

I found out that the victims had been poisoned by gas when they carried the two hostages to us.

I believe that transporting victims without the required number of accompanying physicians, medics, and rescuers played a negative role.