Andrei Shary: We will be talking about the drama of the spectators and actors from the musical ‘Nord-Ost’, which was taken hostage by a Chechen unit under the command of Movsar Barayev.

The act of terrorism was committed late in the evening at Dubrovka. On the night of Friday-Saturday the terrorists were neutralized. Official data on the outcome of the special operation are as follows: more than 750 hostages were released, 34 terrorists killed, 2 arrested, and the victims of the tragedy are at least a hundred people and this number, unfortunately, is rising.

What will be the political and social consequences of these events in Russia? How will Moscow now go about its policies in Chechnya? These three nights of terror — were they a victory or a defeat for the security services? Answering these questions on ‘Radio Liberty’ is Grigory Yavlinsky, the leader of the ‘Yabloko’ Democratic Party of Russia.

Asking him questions will be Gisbert Mrozek, Moscow correspondent for the German news agency ‘RUFO’, and Valery Vyzhutovich, columnist for ‘Moskovskie Novosti’. Moderating the program is Andrei Shary.

Grigory Alexeyevich (Yavlinsky), today we will make do without our usual format, so there will be no biographies because of this situation.

Yesterday on the air, one of our listeners assessed the results of the special operation, as well as the behavior of the Russian leadership during this crisis, and she said something along the lines of: “We felt that a just power with us.” How would you assess their approach? And as a citizen of Russia, how would you assess the government’s actions during these three days?

Grigory Yavlinsky: I have to say right off that I cannot give a complete assessment right now. It would be irresponsible on my part, and, by the way, I would like to encourage everyone to be extremely attentive to the situation in and of itself, and to its lessons as well as everything that went on.

The fact is that today some very important elements of the situation are very unclear. We do not know how many people we lost. We do not know the dynamics of the situation. We do not know what exactly was done, or even why it was done, once we understand what was done.

I would like to tell our listeners everything right off the bat, but, unfortunately, it is still too early and we cannot evaluate it as a whole. Yesterday, for example, I spent a lot of time in various hospitals. I talked with these people and watched what was happening to them. I talked with the doctors. This was all absolutely necessary in order to understand things. Today there will be meeting with representatives of security services, and we will try to find out what really went on, and why. And gradually, but rather quickly, we will be getting information so that we can move objectively. The information as it appears will allow us to draw conclusions.

Here is my political assessment, and its main feature is the fact that the information speaks for itself. This information tells us whether they got all the militants, or if some of them got away, because right from the start there have been contradictory statements. How many victims were there, what was done for them, and what will be the aftereffects? Therefore, we need a little more patience and a little more than the usual fairness in making our assessments — that is what the situation calls for today.

Andrei Shary: Nevertheless, Gregory Alexeyevich, and I respect and accept your point of view, but you know or should know a lot more than ordinary citizens or even more than we do, as journalists, even though we were closely following the developments. At the level of your current knowledge, are you ready make give some sort of an assessment? You can say, “No, I’m not ready.” Are you ready to make some kind of an assessment? What seems fundamentally important to me is how the authorities as a whole acted.

Grigory Yavlinsky: It is possible today to make some technical assessments. This is an important component, but today it is certainly insufficient, inadequate. This could have been said two days ago, or even yesterday morning, but right now a technical assessment is not enough. Any political assessment made today would be useless, since there is insufficient information. It is hard right now to discuss indigenous issues connected with the war in this situation, the war that is, as a matter of fact, going on in Chechnya, because such events carry the character of the changing political reality. Here is an event that has happened in Moscow, and it will change the political reality.

I can tell you what I do know: there were several options being worked out, and I was directly involved in working on one of them. These options were later presented to the President, and, as a matter of fact, not later, they were constantly being examined interactively. The decision was made, and we still do not fully understand what that was, but it was based on the experiences and views of those authorized to offer such an option in such events, and decided by those authorized to make such a decision. I can say that the work was continuous. I can say that it caused enormous stress for all senior executives. I can say that I myself spent practically two days, almost never leaving the Kremlin, discussing these issues and developing different scenarios. At the last meeting with the President, I actually said that there are two possible solutions, but only one person could decide on one or the other, and he is the one who makes the final decision, and, therefore, takes full responsibility. And we know what decision was made.

But I must tell you that it was made without disclosing the contents of the decision to anyone, and I was not made aware of the details of the decision.

Gisbert Mrozek: Still, I have a question. Although it is clear that it is impossible just now to assess the subtleties of it, and there is not enough information to analyze its impact, but what about an overall assessment as to whether or not the assault was a victory over terrorism? What would you say?

Grigory Yavlinsky: I would say that there has been a terrible tragedy, a terrible tragedy. I would say, and I would like to say that I wish to convey my sorrow and the sorrow of all who were with me in discussions during those days, and to convey my condolences to the relatives of those killed, and my sympathy to those who suffered. Because for all the former (hostages) who were at this time in that hall, this thing will not pass without leaving lasting effects, both from a psychological, moral, and, I believe in terms of physical health, unfortunately.

Gisbert Mrozek: Because they used the gas.

Grigory Yavlinsky: Because they used some special substance, and we still do not know which. So my overall assessment is that this is not about terrorism, in terms of my assessment. This is my assessment: it is a terrible tragedy. That is what I can say.

Gisbert Mrozek: Do you think it might have been possible to prevent this tragedy?

Grigory Yavlinsky: Here lies complexity of today’s assessments. Why can we not come to a final conclusion? Because of this, I have to utter this banal phrase: “History has no subjunctive tenses.” I was there, I talked with these people, and I can tell you with full accountability that, to the best of my understanding, we could not count on anything definitively.  There were people before you of a certain type that, no matter what, it was absolutely impossible to anticipate a thing, or be sure of anything. That is, one could, with varying degrees of probability, offer different solutions, but weighing these was impossible. There could be only one criterion, and, as in every case where there is not enough information, it is a moral criterion, so let us say. I acted in accordance with this.

But in every case, to specifically assess the likelihood of every development… That would have been unthinkable, simply unthinkable.

Valery Vyzhutovich: Why did you not look at going outside the box with this option, and make some sort of concession to the terrorist demands? Could Putin, risking his political reputation, rating…

Andrei Shary: If not his career.

Valery Vyzhutovich: If not his career, yes, could he at least have stated his readiness to make a troop withdrawal, of excess troops as Oleg Mironov, Commissioner for Human Rights, put it. Why is this option not being considered right now, and did they consider it at the Kremlin, if you were participating in these consultations?

Grigory Yavlinsky: I meant what was considered were several options, for each particular action there was this or that option. There were not many, in my view there were two options, and I worked on one while the other was worked out without my participation. But the point here is not the President’s career. The fact is, firstly, tomorrow you might get the same situation in some kindergarten in Penza, then in Rostov, and then with a school and later once again with a hospital. This has no end, and that is what everyone understands.

Secondly, yes, this guaranteed absolutely nothing! It did not guarantee a thing here! There was, so to speak, in quotation marks, I would put this in quotation makes, or even in parentheses, there was a “negotiating partner” from whom you could expect every three minutes a change of every position, he would “press” you with tremendous force to do anything. “But you didn’t make the right statement, you did such and such, and we were told from there that even if it was stated, it wasn't just right…” It was impossible, and when they tell you: “We’re going to start shooting someone every three hours” or “now we're going to blow up everyone” — believe me, there were simply no good solutions.

After they seized 800 or how many there were people that were sitting there, there was no such solution that you could arrive at coolly. This is for a special “negotiator”.

Valery Vyzhutovich: Okay. But after what we got now, is there any guarantee that this will not happen again?

Grigory Yavlinsky: There are no guarantees when dealing with terrorism, not for anyone, in anything, not ever. But you have to choose some sort of logic. So here is the logic of say, roughly speaking, like the Israelis, right? And there is another logic — negotiations. There has been such a precedent, right? But you have to choose some kind of logic. I deliberately said that those who made the decisions were people who made it based on their experiences and views. And you should not forget that as well. You see, I have my views and I would take another, a different solution based on my views, and would have taken upon myself the responsibility. But I cannot pretend that I can replace anyone in this regard, I have no such authority.

So, we must, respectfully and with patience, relate to what we have here, because there are additional factors as well. What kind of security services do we have, and in what shape are they? What is actually possible and who will carry it all out? This is not an abstract conversation. It was there, only three kilometers from the Kremlin. It had to be solved. It was later that they came up with the idea that it was in Dubrovka, in some other city. People were asking: “Is that some town, some village?” What village? You know, it was right next door.

Therefore, we should be very seriously weighing every word and evaluating it all, because this also affects the lives and health of people. There were no harmless options. There were no guaranteed options, and there never will. This is war.

Andrei Shary: Grigory Alexeyevich, for all three days we were almost continuously on the air, for more than 60 hours. The whole time I tried to understand it all, and a question bothers me: what was the logic of these people? You talked to Barayev personally. What can you say about this? Were you able to understand a little of what made them tick?

Grigory Yavlinsky: These people were very young, twenty-one or twenty-two years of age. These people, I do not even know if they went to school or not, because they grew up during the war. These were people whose style of what they did was in almost everything. They seemed to have reached the top of their “professional” (in quotes) careers. There were these people, very young, very, very young.

Andrei Shary: And the price, the price of this success, their lives, this did not bother them at all?

Grigory Yavlinsky: But that is the way the game is played. By the way, at their age the value of life is completely different. There they said a lot along those lines to me. Here they would say: “Our demand is to stop the war.” I said: “I understand. Now explain what this means.” The question, “what does this mean?” confused them. They were lost on this issue. They could not answer the question. “Well how? However you started the war, that’s how you end it.”

I said, “let’s try to break this down into simple parts” and that caused them confusion, and confusion causes irritation…

Andrei Shary: And anger.

Grigory Yavlinsky: Certainly. And everything, and that was it and we had to start all over again. This is a special matter, how to do it all.

But these were entirely very young people who had no experience in politics or negotiation. I can tell you, that if someone sent them…

Andrei Shary: Did you find out if someone sent them, or not?

Grigory Yavlinsky: They said that they had a commander that made all the decisions for them.

Andrei Shary: You would not know who this was? Maskhadov?

Grigory Yavlinsky: No. As far as Maskhadov, they said that they recognize him, that he is their president, and that, of course, if he said something to them or appealed to them, that would be it, but I got the impression that it was not about him they were talking when they were talking about their commander or someone there.

Gisbert Mrozek: There was information that there were also some veterans, so to speak, of Budennovsk. Did you see them there?

Grigory Yavlinsky: Listen, I talked with their commander and two of his deputies. Everyone else in the room was wearing a mask. I did not see them. Maybe there were people who were older, but none of them participated in the negotiations. Any way, I am talking about those who participated in the negotiations. I want to say that the combination that was thought up was like this. It was more of a whetstone, sort of a tool for carrying out the whole thing. There were no real political negotiations or any structure intended to what they were saying. They could not articulate a thing.

Valery Vyzhutovich: They were not programmed to achieve any positive end? They entered this dead end on purpose? They understood that it was a dead end from which there was no way out?

Grigory Yavlinsky: I got the impression that they were programmed to do two things. First, they were to carry out this thing, and they were infinitely pleased that it was technically possible and repeated that every two minutes. This was my first impression. And secondly, my impression was that they were programmed to the fact that they would die, and there was this bravado, almost as if it were joy. That is everything. Though it is true, that it did not mean that they specifically approached it like that, at the same time there was the fact that they wanted to say it all the time and put you in such a position that you found it difficult to argue or do anything in general.

Well, if a person says: “But for me…” How did they put it? They said: “We want to die more than you want to live.” When such a thing is stated, the grounds for negotiating disappear. And they demonstrated this bravado.

Gisbert Mrozek: A question. In such a situation, what did you suggest as an alternative solution? If it is even possible, of course, to talk about it at all. You said that you participated in the planning, but it was rejected, or not accepted, so to speak.

Grigory Yavlinsky: There was another direction. It was associated with using incremental steps in an attempt to work out the problem there, to dissect it into parts and to try, step by step, to exchange each part for hostages, to move in that direction.

Andrei Shary: Grigory Alexeyevich, I still do not understand one thing, and if you can, please explain this to me, it is in regard to the fact that you met with the President, and with Voloshin there, and, I do not know, with generals from the KGB, the FSB. I understand the reasons why in principle they were looking for certain people who these terrorists could trust, and, judging from what you are saying, I do not think that they even knew very well who you were, for example. They were so uneducated, and so forth. Clearly there could have been Aslakhanov, Khasbulatov, maybe these names might have meant something to them, but I am not so sure about this either.

However, as far as we know, did they not put forward some demands that someone from the Kremlin come to them, someone with some authority who could decide something? Was this the correct tactic, that they did not send anyone for a long time, that Kazantsev was appointed to be the president's representative? Already after they promised to shoot hostages, it was already clear, for example, here in the editorial offices that we could expect something because the deputy interior minister said that they were changing the rules for the broadcasting from there, am I right? No more live broadcasts. That was the best indicator that something was going to happen that night, something the authorities would find hard to let me have as a professional journalist. Over here right away we sent everybody out in all directions, we were all waiting because it was obvious that something was going to happen that night, but it was only at that point that they appointed Kazantsev. Do you have any explanation for this?

Grigory Yavlinsky: Yes, it was the principled position of the President that the State would not negotiate. This had been one of the options.

Andrei Shary: So you were not there as representative of the State? You went in there as a private person?

Grigory Yavlinsky: No. First of all, I did not have that authority, and secondly, though I was in constant contact with the administration and the President himself, but I did it on my own initiative and, in fact, on their behalf as well. But it was our joint work. I had no such authority to go to up them and say: “I am authorized to do this or that and declare the following to you.” I had no such authority.

Andrei Shary: If I am drawing the right conclusion from what you are saying, they appointed Kazantsev when they realized that an assault was inevitable and there would be no negotiations?

Grigory Yavlinsky: If you were to ask this question of the administration, they would have told you: “We never removed him and he was always authorized by the President to negotiate there with Zakayev, with Maskhadov…  And that’s why we didn’t remove him. That’s why, when the situation began to deteriorate, we just invited him, but the President never removed his authority.” That is what they would tell you.

Andrei Shary: But now this tactic of inviting you, or your participation, or consenting to your participation and the participation of Anna Politkovskaya, who brought water into there, and so on and so forth. In these negotiations, how did the people in charge of the situation in the country perceive it, was this a correct decision?

Grigory Yavlinsky: It was a tactical decision, and the headquarters and the specialists sitting there, they felt that it was the right thing to do. If they wanted to talk with someone, let them talk. I think that the country’s political leadership reacted to this as a technical decision that was thrust upon them. That is what I think, though in this case I got the sanction afterwards, I received this offer, I became aware of the offer when I was in the city of Tomsk at the funeral of a close colleague of mine, and I discussed this sanction for a meeting right away with the Kremlin. Why? Because it would have been absolutely senseless, really quite pointless to go in there, without any sanction on the part of the Kremlin. It would just be an empty exercise.

Gisbert Mrozek: Like many such…

Grigory Yavlinsky: Just completely empty! Quite unnecessary, yes? So therefore it was absolutely necessary. There was a sanction, and there had been the whole time.

Andrei Shary: Valery Vyzhutovich, it is your turn.

Valery Vyzhutovich: How much were the people who went in to see the terrorists — Dr. Roshal, Politkovskaya, and yourself — how free were they afterwards to communicate with the press, in their comments that they made in front of the cameras? You said that you think, you feel, or you sense that your every word had been agreed to in advance with the operational headquarters and with the security services?

Grigory Yavlinsky: As for me, I simply did not talk to the press intentionally.

Valery Vyzhutovich: I mean these people who did come out and gave interviews anyway.

Grigory Yavlinsky: I can only speak for myself. No one put any restrictions on me. I put them on myself because I thought it was totally wrong from any standpoint and very irresponsible and unprofessional. Here, even what I told you just now I would have never started saying these things during the time of these contacts because they could watch everything, they sat and watched TV. Why would I try to disorient them, for what? What would be the point? So, I considered it to all to be confidential, and the development of the plan, and the other option, this was very detailed and step-by-step in every element. It was not clear what plan would be used, but I thought it necessary in any case to discuss none of it in public. I had no task. What could I add to all of this? What did I think about the people who were in there? This was not the first time I have conducted such negotiations, the hardest kind, with the Chechens. This was probably the third time, and I just knew for a fact that nothing good was ever going to come out of this.

Andrei Shary: Grigory Alexeyevich, by the way, did they speak Russian well?

Grigory Yavlinsky: Quite normally.

Andrei Shary: Without an accent? That is to say, they say that the generation that…

Grigory Yavlinsky: Well, a very heavy accent.

Andrei Shary: With a very heavy accent, right?

Grigory Yavlinsky: Yes, and they even had some difficulties. They even made the stated the following reservation: “Perhaps we don’t understand everything and can’t express ourselves in everything.” This is the way it was. They were very young, very young.

Gisbert Mrozek: Yesterday you were in hospital and spoke with the released hostages, with patients. How are getting along? Why are so many of them dying?

Grigory Yavlinsky: It is a very difficult situation, a difficult situation. Because these people have suffered, there is a complex of things that they went through and the most important thing is that a lot of them were poisoned, and felt poisoned, and tests show that there was a very serious poisoning.

Gisbert Mrozek: From what?

Grigory Yavlinsky: Some substances were used which have severe effects. For example, increased serum enzymes indicate the strongest poisoning, a severe poisoning. What their dynamics are going to be and what their prospects are, these depend on what was actually used. It depends on the condition of a specific person and depends on where he was sitting in the hall, that is, how much of a dose he just got and how fast he was taken outside into the street, and it depends on how professionally the doctors treated him when he did get to the doctors. What other illnesses he had, how healthy he was before it all happened. There is a whole pile of all sorts of fundamentals and so this is a serious trauma for people, from every point of view.

Gisbert Mrozek: Is what they used really not known?

Grigory Yavlinsky: I do not know. Everyone whom I asked, including the doctors, they do not know.

Gisbert Mrozek: Even the doctors do not know?

Grigory Yavlinsky: I do not know, and none of the doctors with whom I spoke said that they knew.

Gisbert Mrozek: If it is possible, one more question. What did they look like, the hostages with whom you spoke?

Grigory Yavlinsky: There were all sorts. These were people who had just suffered such a strong psychological trauma that they could not adequately assess the situation going on around them. There were others who felt better. There you have it. Of course, there exists that completely insane, in my view, situation with the relatives, that the hospitals are closed to them and no one can get in there.

Andrei Shary: But why is no one is allowed in? Do you have an answer to this? Did someone at the top give this order, or is it because the hospitals are simply overwhelmed? Or is it because they do not want anyone to see what condition these people are in?

Grigory Yavlinsky: I think this is so, apart from the bureaucratic nonsense, what is behind all of this is the desire to hide something, or to not show something, and to make sure that something remains secret. In my opinion that makes everything worse. People today all but stormed the 13th hospital. Such an attitude towards the relatives after a trauma like this is completely inexplicable. Everyone is looking for each other.

Therefore, I said that today it is still impossible to assess what went on. This, of course, has been a huge shock for Moscow, and it is also very difficult to receive 800 people in this serious situation, in serious condition. There is also the matter of the rescue service, which also turned out to be vulnerable, and there is also the riot police who went in there, and rescue workers who went in immediately after them, they are also there among the victims.

Valery Vyzhutovich: Judging from the fact that relatives are not allowed into the hospitals, there is obviously some secret they are trying to hide from the public. What do you think, the kind of gas that was used, is this purely a technical matter, or may it have some political significance? Can we assume that they may have used certain substances that are forbidden?

Grigory Yavlinsky: This certainly has a significance that goes beyond the technical. Today we simply cannot say whether this was a gas that is used in police work, or if it was this or that kind of gas, or if the question is related to the concentration of the gas. We cannot make an assessment today about what went on, but your question is valid from that point of view that the assessment will depend largely on what actually happened.

Gisbert Mrozek: Was its use at least partially compatible, and was their any contact with security services in the West?

Grigory Yavlinsky: If you have this information… I have no such information, because, once again I will say that I worked on the other option. I was not included in this option.

Andrei Shary: Grigory Alexeyevich, there were.

Grigory Yavlinsky: If indeed there were such contacts, and, as you say, security services in the West were in the loop, then most likely this precludes it being any kind of gas that can be evaluated… I do not even want to come back to this, because this is already going way outside the framework. If they were involved, then it is quite another story, so then it may be a question of how it was used, that is, in what dosage? But in general I am not an expert in this field.

Andrei Shary: I am going to return to my colleagues’ question about the details of this option. Tell us what you suggested, if possible.

Grigory Yavlinsky: I tried to break the problem as put forward into its elements. Then I tried to convince them that the common solution, about which they were speaking, consisted of these elements. Then I tried to get them to agree to what would actually happen if we went according to these elements, and how they would respond, and then I tried to reconcile these elements with those who were responsible for making the decisions and implementing these elements sooner or later.

Andrei Shary: What were the elements, for example?

Grigory Yavlinsky: Well, for example, the cleansings. There were, for example, questions about the use of heavy weapons. Not just heavy weapons per se, but for example, weapons that are not in use there. There were conversations with the top leaders of our country here in Moscow, and over there, with people whom they recognize as leaders. And there were conversations about any action that could lead to a definite decision regarding the hostages. That is, it was a step-by-step option.

Andrei Shary: But were they able to perceive how you felt, did it seem like that to you, in what you were saying?

Grigory Yavlinsky: It was a very complicated matter. It was impossible to be sure. When you work out such a plan, you have the feeling that you have developed it, put it forwards, everything has been done in parts, and it seems as if the other person has given their consent, but then the next minute you are no longer sure that you are meeting with someone from the other side who is supposed to do something, and you are no longer sure that you will not call them up five minutes later and he would tell you: “I don't know anything, I’m not interested in any of this, it all has to be all or nothing” and once again it is back to square one. There was no such confidence, so therefore there was so much difficulty. There was no one with whom you could talk seriously. There were these twenty-one year olds who could probably shoot, fight, and set off charges, they were desperate and ready to die, but these were not the people with whom you can hold any political or even quasi-political negotiations.

Gisbert Mrozek: So it was a completely different situation from Budennovsk, where there were talks between Viktor Chernomyrdin and Shamil Basayev?

Grigory Yavlinsky: In this situation, those with whom I spoke…

Andrei Shary: Basayev could not be located.

Grigory Yavlinsky: There was no one that Viktor Stepanovich (Chernomyrdin) could have talked with intelligently.

Andrei Shary: Grigory Alexeyevich, one more technical question. How did they organize these talks? That is, you got in touch with the Kremlin while you were in Tomsk and there was a certain decision made for you to go in there. You accepted it and the Kremlin agreed to this kind of step. Then you came here. Who informed them that you were coming, how did they present you to them, as it were, was there some other mediator or something else?

Grigory Yavlinsky: I called the President and said that there was this idea that I believed is was correct. If they wanted it, I was ready to do it. It had to do with the lives of a very large number of people, and I was ready to do it. His answer was positive. I was talking in particularly with Alexander Voloshin, and he said, “Call this number and get in touch with the chief of the headquarters and he will work out all the technical details.”

I flew to Moscow, it was about nine o’clock and I called up the headquarters. I was told: “We’ll give you the green light, and when you drive up, tell them your license plate number and who will be in your car and you will be passed directly to headquarters.” At the same time, once again I contacted the Kremlin to discuss all details and we agreed that immediately after the meeting I was to go there and we would discuss what could come from all of this.

When I got there, I met with the headquarters chief, and in ten minutes he contacted one of the representatives of those who had seized the building. He handed me the phone. The man on the other end said: “I recognize your voice.” He then said something strange, which was hard to believe: “We’ll see you. Come to us. Come here.” I asked: “How do I get there?” and he said: “Come here, go into the foyer, then turn left and go up to the second floor.”

Andrei Shary: Alone?

Grigory Yavlinsky: “The conditions,” he said. “Take no weapons with you, and you are alone. If you agree, come, if you dare.” After that I went.

Andrei Shary: Where did you talk?

Grigory Yavlinsky: On the second floor, in a storeroom, this has been shown a lot on TV. There is a storeroom for the snack bar.

Andrei Shary: Did you see any hostages?

Grigory Yavlinsky: No, I did not see any. There I discussed those issues that I have already shared with you. I also discussed issues related to the release of the children and more of the hostages. I got some sort of promise, though they said: “We won't release anyone in exchange for someone, we don’t bargain.” But I said: “This is how you want it.” So he says: “Well, in the morning we’ll release children under 13 years of age.”

Valery Vyzhutovich: In light of these events, the television programs had an obvious propaganda slant. You may recall that suddenly there was information that the terrorists intended to release persons of the Muslim faith, and Georgians. Afterwards this information was not confirmed. Were you not bothered by the speed with which the television stations threw out this information for the public?

Grigory Yavlinsky: In general I was bothered by the work of the television stations the whole time, in the fullest sense.

Andrei Shary: All of the stations?

Grigory Yavlinsky: Yes, I think, all of them. From the perspective of the issue that was being broadcast, I would say that it, in my opinion, was unprofessional work, simply unprofessional. I do not advocate any specific restrictions or any instructions or any decisions on censorship. But in this case professionalism was very important and the situation was really very difficult. Here what was needed was the usual professionalism, well, in truth it may not have been usual, it was very high level, allowing one to make correct assessments and send the right message.

Gisbert Mrozek: Still, I would like to talk about the overall assessment and do this to some depth, so to speak. We are not talking about technical details. Tell me please, if you compare this with the seizure of hostages at Budennovsk, Kizlyar, and Pervomaisk, this was the third event of this magnitude, and the former ended in the complete defeat of the federal forces, so to speak. But how about now? What is the fundamental difference?

Grigory Yavlinsky: Right now it is impossible to make an assessment, because neither you nor I know how many were saved and how many died. Neither you nor I know how many of the hostage-takers were arrested and killed, and how many got away. Neither you nor I know a thing about this. Without knowing these details, how we can make an assessment?

Gisbert Mrozek: Not even in general?

Grigory Yavlinsky: Not even in general. Here is the President yesterday, he also did not say a thing, he said: “They saved hundreds of people,” but he did not give a figure, he announced a day of mourning for Monday, from what I know. There was no fanfare from him about a successful situation. There used to be this old Soviet method: “Behold, Sidor Ivanovich, fat and happy, he was in charge of the operation, here, Sidor Ivanovich, tell us how it all went,” and Sidor Ivanovich begins to weave some tale. But that was not the case here, that is, everyone understands that a tragedy has taken place, a real tragedy.

All of this can be considered as a terrible tragedy, one with which it is still quite impossible to come to grips. People are still standing at the gates of hospitals. They cannot find anything out. Wives are looking for their husbands, and husbands are looking for their wives. People are looking for their children. There is even this situation inside the hospital, I saw this: there was a man lying there and he did not know what happened to his wife who was with him at this concert. He could find her. Here he is lying there, and he does not know where she ended up. This is a human drama of colossal proportions.

And we still do not yet know if they prepared antidotes for this situation, and if they prepared the appropriate antidotes, what was done. We do not know, and all of this speaks volumes and the information that we will get give its own assessment, we only need to gather it all and then will become clear what actually happened.

Valery Vyzhutovich: Could you predict now how the authorities will behave after all that has happened? What will we see next? A patriotic euphoria and a desire to stamp it out, to finish the job down there and so on? Or will there appear a sober understanding that we have to end this war?

Grigory Yavlinsky: I do not know. I have no clarity. The fact is, that whatever they state to be the political process rectifying or remedying the situation in Chechnya, there is, in my view, no such thing, and there is that absolutely firm position in this referendum, the Constitution, and the elections. That is a fact. This is also some theory about the development of events, or such a policy, right? I have too many questions, and too many doubts. Is what we are discussing here in fact what is being done? There is such a line of thinking.

Andrei Shary: Grigory Alexeyevich, here just now I thought that inside me I have two feelings that are in conflict with one another, and I cannot connect them. On the one hand, when you talk about the tragedy and you talk about the President’s speech, I get the impression that Putin made an adequate assessment of the situation on the other hand, and is evaluating it. Because, in my opinion, his speech yesterday was one of the best, if not the best, of his entire political career.

On the other hand, I will continue with what Valery started to talk about, it is this idea about the state-owned TV stations. I am not including NTV and TVS. What I am talking about are the state stations. These are television stations that the state has control over, and that means that the government can broadcast its ideas or ideological concepts directly. I am not saying this is good or bad, but the government has this right, and has paid money for it.

What Valery said was the idea that they would be releasing the Muslims and the Georgians, the idea that this was all linked to international terrorism and this was, in my opinion, late Friday night just before the assault. I saw a report on RTR that it was all connected and all of it, of course, fell apart. It fell apart because there were these supposed recordings in Arabic. I did not understand them, but they allegedly translated someone in there talking with someone about getting some weapons. Perhaps it was true. I could not understand as a viewer how it was all connected the current situation.

I am leaning towards the fact that this was an attempt to portray it all as a continuation of Indonesia and the Philippines, of September 11th, a direct continuation. I accept this position in general, but I am not sure about it with regards to this act. Personally I do not think that its roots are in it. It is because there is this war in Chechnya, which is like a cancer, and it has metastasized. Maybe you can help me solve this, my dilemma between an adequate understanding of the situation by the President, and what I just said here?

Grigory Yavlinsky: I cannot answer in every detail, but I can convey my assumptions and what I know. Well, first of all, I would say that the roots of the situation that occurred in Moscow is our war in Chechnya, how it proceeds, and in its forms and methods. My position on this issue remains unchanged. This is more than a tragedy for Russia; it is a path to nowhere. And I want to reiterate that sooner or later it will end with a peace conference in Moscow, similar to the peace conference in Tajikistan, which will be attended by the President of Russia and all the people who can be brought to this conference from Chechnya, other than war criminals, and it will take place on the basis of the Russian Constitution and Russian Law, because at this date, doing anything else other than in the framework of such a conference is impossible.

I only used Tajikistan as a successful example, though true, it is another nation, in contrast to Chechnya, but we have such an example of success. Sooner or later it will happen. And in general this is a guide of what must be done in Chechnya, and to this we should aspire. It is difficult right now to talk about every stage and every detail, because of what just happened in Moscow, this has changed the entire political reality, including in Chechnya. So now we need to develop new elements to move toward this goal. But this is, first of all, this goal setting, that is, the goal toward which we should head, of course, once again, what happened to us here in Moscow is directly related to this war.

This here question I can explain to you at a technical level, and, probably, it will be the best explanation. The President personally addressed the issue of this and this situation around us. They have formulated this policy, and it is completely different from they are saying on television. What has hit them on the head is what they were talking about. There was not enough professionalism on the part of the journalists so as not to shame themselves. It was either that, or they were just too lazy to analyze it and the situation developed with such frightening speed and they were not ready in advance. Therefore there was this chaos and a complete mess, and everything possible went out on the air.

Remember the morning broadcasts? The deputy interior minister came out and said: “We have a number of militants who have fled, contact us and we will save your lives.” And this was on a state-owned station. Then the following story on the state-owned channel — Patrushev and Gryzlov go to the president and say: “We got them all.” And the next story, because they repeat over and over again, the same thing… I really thought that they would not show it a second time, but nothing of the sort. So there they were, one after the other, the one saying: “Give yourselves up.” And the others are saying: “It’s over, there’s no one left to give up.” And that was the story for the day. There is no need to be someone important, just take look at that and you can make the appropriate assessment. That is what I think was really going on.

Andrei Shary: Thank you. Our program is coming to an end, and so I traditionally ask our colleagues on the program to draw up a short summary of the conversation, as difficult as that is going to be today. Valery, let us start with you.

Valery Vyzhutovich: I think the most important issue touched upon in our conversation was the topic that relates to what gas was used and what aftereffects it might have. Due to the fact that right now no one, including our interlocutor, has enough information about it, it seems to me that this topic might be very important in the coming week and perhaps we will be able to return once again to this theme.

Gisbert Mrozek: Of course, it is not only what gas they used, but how and in what situation is it used, and if it was adequate or if was it necessary to save the lives of the hostages. We can assume that perhaps it was. And one more thing that I think is important: to understand if there may have been an international makeup to what goes on in these, in Russian internal conflicts. But at the root is Chechnya, and we need to solve Chechnya so that this is not to be repeated endlessly.

Andrei Shary: I will allow myself in this case to disagree with my colleagues. I think that what we touched on today was another fundamental question, and the most important question. It is the question of the government’s responsibility for the security of its citizens. The gas was a technique, and this — what happened in Moscow — was a terrible tragedy, but now we must think about how to make this tragedy the last. I am grateful to Grigory Yavlinsky, because he consented to continue this conversation in a week. I am certain that this conversation needs to be continued, and not only on the air here on ‘Radio Liberty’. But we for our part will do everything to ensure that the government does not forget that it is responsible for the safety and lives of its citizens, and that in order to solve this problem it should make any concessions, no matter how these concessions may stain their uniforms.

On ‘Radio Liberty’
October 28th, 2002.
http://www.svoboda.org/programs/ftf/2002/ftf.102802.asp

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