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| Ustinovskaya, Yekaterina |
| Óæå 22 ãîäà... |
| 24/10/24 13:38 more... |
| author Àíîíèì |
| Kurbatova, Christina |
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Äåòêè Ìèëûå, õîðîøèå íàøè äåòêè!!! Òàê ïðîñòî íå äîëæíî áûòü, ýòî áîëüíî, ýòî íå÷åñòíî, ýòî óæàñíî. |
| 30/06/24 01:30 more... |
| author Îëüãà |
| Grishin, Alexey |
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Ïàìÿòè Àëåêñåÿ Äìèòðèåâè÷à Ãðèøèíà Ñâåòëàÿ ïàìÿòü ïðåêðàñíîìó ÷åëîâåêó! Ìû ðàáîòàëè â ÃÌÏÑ, òîãäà îí áûë ìîëîäûì íà÷àëüíèêîì îòäåëà ìåòàëëîâ, ïîäàþùèì áîëü... |
| 14/11/23 18:27 more... |
| author Áîíäàðåâà Þëèÿ |
| Panteleev, Denis |
| Âîò óæå è 21 ãîä , à áóäòî êàê â÷åðà !!!! |
| 26/10/23 12:11 more... |
| author Èðèíà |
| Ustinovskaya, Yekaterina |
| Ïîìíèì. |
| 24/10/23 17:44 more... |
| author Àíîíèì |
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The October 2002 Moscow |
| Written by Äæîí Á. Äàíëîï/John B. Dunlop | ||||||||
| ×åòâåðã, 08 ßíâàðü 2004 | ||||||||
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Part 1 The Nominal Leader Of The Terrorists A young man who called himself Movsar Baraev served as the titular leader of the group of terrorists that took control of the Moscow theater. Movsar Baraev -- who also went by the names Mansur Salamov and Movsar Suleimenov (28) -- had but a single claim to fame: He was the nephew of the late Chechen Wahhabi kidnapper and murderer Arbi Baraev. According to a report appearing in the military newspaper «Krasnaya zvezda,» Arbi Baraev «had personally participated in the murder of 170 persons.»(29) Nonetheless, Baraev, Movsar's uncle, «had moved freely about the [Chechen] republic showing at federal checkpoints the documents of an officer of the Russian MVD [Interior Ministry].»(30) «On the windshield of [Arbi] Baraev's vehicle,» journalist Anna Politkovskaya has noted, «there was a pass, regularly renewed, which stated that the driver was free 'to go everywhere' -- the most cherished and respected pass in the Combined Group of [Russian] Forces.»(31) Arbi Baraev also had reported shadowy ties to both the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Russian Military Intelligence (GRU). (32) The Active Phase of the Operation BeginsIn January 2003, a Good reasons exist to doubt that Movsar was the actual leader of the group. «Under his [Movsar Baraev's] control,» Sanobar Shermatova has stipulated, «were [only] five to six rebels, and he never demonstrated either the military or organizational abilities necessary for a commander…. The Chechens [sources of „Moskovskie novosti“] say that Baraev himself was not fully initiated into the plan [to seize the theater]. He was supposed to play his role and then burn up like a rocket booster.» The former Further testimony that Movsar was not the real leader comes from Shamil Basaev. In late April 2003, Basaev recalled: «I included [Movsar] Baraev in this group only in late September [2002]. I had only two hours to talk to him and give instructions.»(35) If Movsar Baraev was at this time in the custody of the GRU (as Nivat's sources claim), then Basaev could only have met with Baraev through the good offices of that elite organization. Such a scenario is not unimaginable. It is known that Basaev himself worked closely with a purported GRU officer named Anton Surikov when Basaev was serving as deputy defense minister of the separatist (from Georgia) republic of Abkhazia in A number of Russian journalists and political analysts have expressed their belief that Basaev and Surikov met together once again some years later -- this time together with the chief of the Russian presidential administration, Aleksandr Voloshin, at the estate of a Saudi international arms dealer in southern France in July 1999, in order to seal an agreement which led to Basaev's invasion of Daghestan the following month. (37) In the summer of 2000, when the newspaper «Versiya» published an article about the alleged meeting complete with a group photograph of Voloshin, Basaev, and Surikov, the paper approached Surikov and he «rather severely» told its correspondents to leave him alone. However, Surikov did not deny that the meeting took place. Moreover, almost a year later, when asked about the possible role of the security forces in organizing the invasion of Daghestan, Surikov replied somewhat mysteriously: «A positive answer to your question would sound unproven, although, in my view, such a perspective on events in part has a right to existence, but only in part.» Among the more prominent individuals who have voiced this perspective was the former secretary of the Russian Security Council, retired General Aleksandr Lebed. He affirmed his belief in October of 1999 that «Basaev and the Kremlin had concluded an agreement,» which had led to the August 1999 invasion of Daghestan. (38) Among the suicide bombers who were present in the Moscow theater, Nivat has also reported, there were two women, who, like Movsar Baraev, had already been placed under arrest by the federal authorities: «At Assinovskaya, a village close to the border with Ingushetia, which is where two of the [Baraev] unit's women came from, their mothers say they had been arrested [by the Russian authorities] and taken to an unknown destination at the end of September [2002]. Secretive in the presence of the outsider that I am, and still considerably shocked, they won't say more.» In a similar vein, in January 2003, the late Duma Deputy and journalist Yurii Shchekochikhin wrote in the newspaper «Novaya Gazeta»: «Unexpectedly, last week I learned that one of the female terrorists in the In addition, the well-connected investigative journalist Aleksandr Khinshtein has reported that some eight of the women suicide bombers were able to take up residence in a former «military city [gorodok]» in Moscow, located on Ilovaiskaya Street, not far from the Dubrovka theater. This complex, which housed a large number of illegal residents prepared to pay bribes to the authorities, was apparently under the protection of corrupt elements among the Moscow police. (40) By The Terrorist Assault On 23 OctoberA series of powerful explosions had been set to go off, beginning on 19 October 2002, with the On 20 October, Aslambek Khaskhanov, who had placed the explosives in the three vehicles, flew from Moscow to Nazran, Ingushetia, using false documents. His decision to leave town has been assessed by one journalist as being due to «banal cowardice.» On that same day, his confederate, «Abubakar,» according to one report, removed the large bomb from the vehicle at the Tchaikovsky Theater." On 23 October, that bomb was then «placed in the house of culture at Dubrovka.»(43) This powerful bomb placed in the theater, it was later revealed, was in fact incapable of detonating: «The power [ministries] have admitted,» «Kommersant» reported in July 2003, «that the most powerful of the homemade bombs which were placed by the Baraevites in the seized theater center at Dubrovka were not in a condition in which they could be detonated. They lacked such important elements as batteries, which made the bombs harmless bolvanki [dummies]. And it was precisely this circumstance that permitted the conducting of a completely successful storm of the theater center.»(44) According to one press report, the powerful bombs placed by Khaskhanov did not go off because of a key design failure. Two of the vehicles that had failed to explode were later located by the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department (MUR) (in January 2003 in a parking lot located off the Zvenigorod Highway), who determined the reason for the failure of the bombs: «The gas tanks of the vehicles were divided hermetically into two parts: in one half was gasoline while the other was filled with a substance similar to plastic explosive together with nails and fragments of steel barbed wire. However, an examination showed that the amount of plastic explosive was so small that even if an explosion had happened, the explosive force would have been insignificant.»(45) (As we have seen, other reports mention a faulty timing mechanism in the bombs.) The explosion of the small bomb contained in the «Tavriya» vehicle that had been parked next to McDonald's restaurant on Porkryshkin Street and had resulted in the death of one person attracted the attention of a unit of MUR, an elite police body designed to combat organized crime and terrorism, commanded by Colonel Yevgenii Taratorin. «The police learned that the 'Tavriya' vehicle that had been blown up had been sold by proxy to a certain Artur Kashinskii…whose real name turned out to be Aslan Murdalov, a native of It was the arrest of Murdalov that forced the terrorists «to accelerate their activities and the seizure of the hostages at Dubrovka, which had first been planned for 7 November.»(47) As journalist Zinaida Lobanova has noted: «The original seizure of the musical The failure of the two car bombs to explode in crowded locations in the center of the capital required the terrorists to speed up and to alter their plans. To return to 23 October -- the day on which the Moscow theater was seized by the terrorists -- shortly before the raid occurred: «Abubakar designated a meeting with [Akhyad] Mezhiev near the Crystal Casino. Abubakar was at the wheel of a Ford Transit [minibus]. He handed over to Mezhiev two Chechen girls on whom suicide belts with explosives had been attached. Abubakar ordered that the girls be taken to a populated place where they could blow themselves up and thus draw the attention of the law-enforcement organs away from the seizure of the House of Culture [at Dubrovka].»(52) «At first,» the account continues, «Mezhiev decided to let the suicide women off at the Pyramid Cafe, but, having learned by radio of the seizure of the House of Culture, he exhibited cowardice.» A bomb blast at this normally crowded cafe located in the very center of Moscow would have been a catastrophic event. In his taped confession to the police, Akhyad Mezhiev related that, on the night of Mezhiev then relates (on the police videotape) how he took the belts away from the An alternative explanation to the version Mezhiev recounted to the police would be that the women terrorists in fact had been let out of the vehicle but their «According to the information of the FSB,» the newspaper «Kommersant» reported on 29 October, «the entire building [at Dubrovka] was mined, and the explosion of only a part of the bombs could have brought about the collapse of the theater building. But only a pair of the bombs that were contained in the belts of One of the Russian emergency workers who entered the building after it was stormed by the special forces, Yurii Pugachev, has recalled: «Personally I saw the bodies of several women in black clothing whose stomachs had literally been blown apart. Evidently the explosive was not very strong.»(58) «If one is to believe the sources of 'Moskovskie novosti,'» Sanobar Shermatova and Aleksandr Teit wrote in an article appearing in April 2003, «several of the women suicide fighters, having understood that gas had been let into the hall, tried to connect the lead wires on their suicide belts. They didn't work, because, instead of explosives, there was a fake there. Was that really the way it really was?»(59) Shamil Basaev has claimed that the original targets of the terrorists were the buildings of the Russian State Duma and the Federation Council. In an article appearing in an underground rebel newspaper, «Ichkeriya,» Basaev even «provides the measurements of the vestibules of the two buildings.»(60) Since, however, Basaev is a habitual distorter of the truth, one must at this point must remain agnostic about what precise building (s) the terrorists intended to target first. The Russian authorities, it has also been reported, had been forewarned of the impending terrorist attack by none other than the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). According to Duma Deputy Yurii Shchekochikhin, he was telephoned on 25 October 2002 by «a In April 2003, there occurred a brief flap when a dissident former FSB officer, Aleksandr Litvinenko, living in London, and a leading Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, reported that an FSB agent of Chechen nationality, Khampash Terkibaev, had been present inside the theater building but had left it before the storming of 26 October. (62) Politkovskaya went on to publish the text of an interview with Terkibaev in which he confirmed that he had indeed been in the building. It emerged, however, that both Litvinenko and Politkovskaya had fallen into an extremely intricate and clever trap, evidently laid by for them by the FSB. Terkibaev, a murky adventurer with almost certain links to the secret police, had boasted during a visit to Baku that he had been in the building at Dubrovka, but he had evidently been lying. Sanobar Shermatova and a Another Chechen, Zaurbek Talikhigov, was arrested by the police following the storming of the theater building. He was apparently a On 23 October, shortly after 9:00 p.m., 40 Chechen terrorists whose titular leader was Movsar Baraev -- but whose de facto leader was the shadowy «Abubakar» (Ruslan El'murzaev) -- stormed (there were no armed guards present so the task was not overly difficult) and took control of the House of Culture at Dubrovka in Moscow, which was putting on the popular musical Blackening MaskhadovOne website, utro.ru, which on occasion elects to convey the views of the Russian secret services, focused attention upon one of the terrorists, the mysterious «Yasir» (another name, as we have seen, used by «Abubakar»): «As 'Utro' has learned from sources in the Russian special services,» the website wrote, «there were several rebels who were On 24 October 2002, the day following the seizure of the theater at Dubrovka, it was reported by the media that President Vladimir Putin «sees the seizure of the hostages in Moscow as one of the links in a chain of the manifestations of international terrorism, in one row with the [recent] terrorist acts in Indonesia and the Philippines. 'These same people also planned the terrorist act in Moscow,' said Putin.»(72) These «Arab» and «radical Islamic» themes were also heavily accented by the hostage takers themselves. At 10:00 p.m. on 23 October, just 50 minutes after the taking of the building: «The [former] minister of propaganda of the Ichkerian republic [i.e., Chechnya], Movladi Udugov, speaks to the BBC Service of Central Asia and the Caucasus. He confirms that the group of field commander [Movsar] Baraev organized the hostage taking. According to Udugov, the group consists of kamikaze terrorists and about 40 [sic] widows of Chechen rebels who are not going to surrender. The building is mined.»(73) Udugov was at the time widely believed to be living in Qatar or another of the Gulf states. Two hours later, a website associated with Udugov, The following day, 24 October, it was reported by the website gazeta.ru, as well as by other media, that: «The Qatar television company The rebels also exhibited a militant radical Muslim stance over the course of the few interviews that they granted to Russian and Western media. As NTV correspondent Sergei Dedukh reported on 25 October (the footage was shown the following day): «The two girls in black whom the rebels called their sisters have explosives on their belts with wires sticking out of them. Could you please tell us what your clothes and the explosives in your belt mean?» An unidentified woman hostage taker replied: «They mean that we shall not stop at anything or anywhere. We are on Allah's way. If we die here, that won't be the end of it. There are many of us, and it will go on.»(78) Movsar Baraev is then quoted by Dedukh as asserting that «the terrorists' only and final goal is the end of the military operation in Chechnya and the withdrawal of [Russian] federal troops.» In an interview with journalist Mark Franchetti of London's «The Sunday Times,» Abubakar is quoted as saying: «We are a suicide group. Here we have bombs and rockets and mines. Our women suicide bombers have their fingers on the detonator at all times. Time is running out…. Let the Russians just try to storm the building. That's all we are waiting for. We cherish death more than you do life.» When he was finally allowed to interview Baraev, Franchetti witnessed this scene: «Baraev and his men paraded three Chechen women dressed in black with headscarves covering all but their eyes. In one hand each held a pistol, in the other a detonator linked to a short wire attached to 5 kilograms of explosive strapped to her stomach. Except for a beam of light from inside the auditorium, the foyer was dark. One of Baraev's men used a torch to show off the explosives belts. 'They work in shifts,' explained Baraev. 'Those on duty have their finger on the detonator at all times. One push of the button and they will explode. The auditorium is mined, all wired up with heavy explosives. Just let the Russians try to break in and the whole place will explode.'»(79) (These statements, as we have seen, were an apparent bluff by the terrorist leaders -- the explosives were not in reality in a condition in which they could be detonated.) Putin and his team, manifestly, now had an 11 September 2001 of their own, though it remains unclear whether or not they had been surprised by this development. Signs in Arabic, the brandishing of the Koran, veiled women suicide bombers dressed all in black -- what more could the Russian leadership need? Moreover, as distinct from 1999, the terrorists on this occasion were unquestionably Chechens, except, perhaps, for a sprinkling of Arabs such as the fictional «Yasir.» The seizing of the theater building, it was In addition to seeking to depict the FOOTNOTESThis statement by Maskhadov was cited later on the same day by official spokesmen for both the FSB and the Interior Ministry as This aggressive campaign by the Russian leadership seems to have borne significant diplomatic fruit. On 30 October, the «Los Angeles Times» reported that «a senior U.S. official» in Moscow had termed Maskhadov «damaged goods» with links to terrorism. The senior official went on to assert that «the Chechen leader should be excluded from peace talks.»(82) In more judicious fashion, one influential Russian democrat and parliamentary faction leader, Grigorii Yavlinskii, confided on 27 October «his view of Maskhadov has changed. If Maskhadov commanded the rebels in the theater, he said, he could never participate in a political settlement.»(83) But how strong was the evidence linking Maskhadov to the terrorist action? Journalist Mikhail Falkov looked into the issue of the tape of Maskhadov's statement that had been shown over In an article appearing in «Moskovskie novosti,» journalists Shermatova and Teit reported that a careful analysis of a hushed conversation that had been conducted in Chechen between Abubakar and Movsar Baraev and had been accidentally captured by NTV on 25 October showed the following: «Here is Movsar Baraev answering the questions of NTV correspondents before a television camera. Next to him stands a rebel, known as Abubakar: he in an undertone in Chechen corrects Movsar. When Baraev declares that they had been sent by Shamil Basaev, Abubakar quietly suggests, 'Pacha ch'ogo al,' 'point to the president.' After that, Movsar obediently adds: 'Aslan Maskhadov.'»(86) Abubakar thus sought publicly to tie Maskhadov directly to the That Abubakar and not Movsar Baraev was the de facto leader of the terrorists also becomes clear from Franchetti's report: «At one point he [Baraev] lowered his guard. Perhaps succumbing to the lure of fame, he offered to let me film the hostages in the auditorium. It seems that Abubakar may also in a subtle way have been involved in helping the federal forces to prepare the storming of the theater. «Several sources in the special services,» the newspaper «Moskovskii komsomolets» reported on 28 October, «have informed us that in the juice which the negotiators took to the hostages, without their knowledge, there was admixed a substance which was to soften the toxic action of the gas.»(88) Abubakar himself raised this topic. Summing up one of her discussion/negotiations with Abubakar, journalist Politkovskaya has recalled: «We agree that I will start bringing water into the building. Bakar suddenly throws in, on his own initiative, 'And you can bring juice.' I ask him if I can also bring food for the children being held inside, but he refuses.»(89) A leading journalist writing on the pages of «Moskovskie novosti,» Valerii Vyzhutovich, looked into the issue of Maskhadov's supposed responsibility for the raid and concluded: «There are no direct proofs convicting Maskhadov of the preparation of the terrorist act in Moscow.» He added that «not a single court, not even ours, the most humane and just,» would uphold the admissibility in a trial of the edited and highly selective footage shown over When Politkovskaya, in a The regime, for its part, seems to have concluded that it now possessed ample, indeed overwhelming, evidence to prove to both Russian citizens and to Western leaders two key points: first, that the hostage takers were dangerous and repugnant international terrorists in the Part 3 (28) Vadim Rechkalov, «Vdovii bunt,» izvestia.ru, 25 October 2002; and Zinaida Lobanova, «Tolko on otvetit za (29) In «Krasnaya zvezda,» 26 June 2001. (30) Sanobar Shermatova, «Glavnyi rabototorgovets,» «Moskovskie novosti,» 29 October 2002. (31) In «Novaya gazeta,» 28 June 2001. (32) Sanobar Shermatova, «Tainaya voina spetssluzhb,» «Moskovskie novosti,» 8 August 2000. (33) Anne Nivat, «Chechnya: Brutality and Indifference,» crimesofwar.org, 6 January 2003. (34) Sanobar Shermatova, «Glavnyi rabototorgovets,» «Moskovskie novosti,» 29 October 2002. (35) (36) «Tainyi sovetnik VPK,» «Zavtra,» 1 June 2001. At the time of this interview, Surikov was serving as head of the State Duma's Department on Industry. On Surikov, see also: Maksim Kalashnikov, «Chelovek, kotoryi verboval Basaeva,» (37) See Petr Pryanshnikov, «Voloshin i Basaev na lazurnom beregu: foto na pamyat,» «Versiya,» 4 July 2000. This article can be found at: http:www.compromat.ru/main/voloshin/basaev.htm. See also: Andrei Batumskii, «Sgovor,» «Versiya,» 3 August 1999. (38) «Doslovno,» «Novaya gazeta,» No. 37, (39) Yurii Shchekochikhin, «Nezamechennye novosti nedeli kotorye menya udivili,» «Novaya gazeta,» No. 4, 20 January 2003. (40) Aleksandr Khinshtein, «Chernye vdovy pod 'kryshei' Petrovki,» «Moskovskii komsomolets,» 23 July 2003. (41) Statement of Moscow's chief procurator Mikhail Avdyukov in «V Moskve gotovilos chetyre (42) «V Moskve gotovilos…» (43) Khinshtein, «Glavnyi terrorist…» (44) Otdel prestupnosti, «U terroristov problemy so vzryvchatkoi,» «Kommersant,» 7 July 2003. The same claim is made in Sergei Topol, Aleksandr Zheglov, Olga Allenova, «Antrakt posle terakta,» «Kommersant,» 23 October 2003. (45) «U terroristov…,» «Kommersant,» 7 July 2003. (46) Khinshtein, «Glavnyi terrorist…» Khinshtein's source for this information was officers of the MUR. (47) Statement of Colonel Taratorin over Russian central television: Leonid Berres, «MUR opravdalsya za (48) Zinaida Lobanova, «Tolko on otvetit…» (49) Khinshtein, «Glavnyi terrorist…» (50) On this episode, see Chapter 5, «Proval FSB v Ryazani,» in Aleksandr Litvinenko, Yurii Feltshtinskii, «FSB vzryvaet Rossiyu» (Internet Edition, 2002). English translation: «Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within» (New York: S.P. I. Books, 2002), pp. (51) Khinshtein, «Glavnyi terrorist…» (52) Ibid. Khinshtein identified Abubakar as being Ruslan Elmurzaev, 30 years old, a native of (53) Zinaida Lobanova, «Tolko on otvetit…» (54) Ibid. (55) Ibid. (56) Kavkaz Tsentr News Agency, 26 April 2003. (57) Sergei Dyupin, Aleksei Gerasimov, Leonid Berres, «Zakhvat zalozhnikov v Moskve,» «Kommersant,» 29 October 2002. (58) Sergei Dyupin, «Peredozirovka,» «Kommersant,» 28 October 2002. (59) Sanobar Shermatova, Aleksandr Teit, «Shestero iz baraevskikh,» «Moskovskie novosti,» 29 April 2003. (60) Sanobar Shermatova, (61) Yurii Shchekochikhin, «TsRU predupredilo,» «Novaya gazeta,» 28 October 2002. (62) See «Litvinenko: Yushenkova ubili za rassledovanie terakta v (63) Sanobar Shermatova, Aleksandr Teit, «Antivakhkhabitskii emissar,» «Moskvovskie novosti,» 13 May 2003. Terkibaev was killed on 15 December 2003 in an automobile crash that some commentators found to be suspicious. «The double agent Terkibaev was removed as a dangerous witness,» the website newsru.com observed on 16 December 2003. (64) «Posobnik terroristov ne uspel spasti zalozhnikov,» «Kommersant,» 11 June 2003. (65) grani.ru, 28 November 2002. The website provided a list of the names of 979 individuals taken captive on 23 October. As of 25 October, 58 of the captives had been released. («The Moscow Times,» 26 October 2002). (66) «V Moskve gotovilos chetyre (67) «Genprokuratura ustanovila imena 33-kh terroristov, zakhvativshikh zalozhnikov v Moskve,» newsru.com, 6 November 2002. Seven remained unidentified as of October 2003. (68) Oleg Petrovksii, «V bande Baraeva byl terrorist iz (69) «Moskva, zalozhniki,» vesti7.ru, 2 November 2002. This program was broadcast on 26 October. (70) «Polnyi spisok opoznannykh terroristov,» gzt.ru, 23 October 2003. (71) Vladimir Demchenko, «Passport terrorista,» izvestia.ru, 24 October 2003. (72) In newsru.com, 24 October 2002. (73) gzt.ru, 25 October 2002. Item posted in English. (74) newsru.com, 24 October 2002. The item was reported at 00:04 a.m. on 24 October. (75) In gazeta.ru, 24 October 2002. (76) «Jazeera Shows Taped Chechen Rebel Statements,» Reuters, 24 October 2002. (77) Associated Press, 26 October 2002. (78) «Russian NTV Shows Previously Filmed Interview with Hostage Takers' Leader,» BBC Monitoring Service, 26 October 2002. (79) Mark Franchetti, «Dream of Martyrdom,» «The Sunday Times,» 27 October 2002. (80) In newsru.com, 27 October. (81) «Russia Seeks to 'Wipe Out' Chechen Leaders,» Reuters, 31 October 2002. (82) Robyn Dixon and David Holley, «U. S. Rejects Chechen Separatist Chief,» «Los Angeles Times,» 30 October 2002. (83) Sharon LaFraniere, «Setback Seen for Rebel Cause,» «The Washington Post,» 28 October 2002. (84) Mikhail Falkov, «Kto i gde gotovil moskovskii terakt?» utro.ru, 31 October 2002. (85) «Chechen Press Release on Moscow Hostage Crisis,» chechenpress.com, 24 October 2002. (86) Sanobar Shermatova, Aleksandr Teit, «Shestero iz baraevskikh,» «Moskovskie novosti,» 29 April 2003. The transcript reads: «[Movsar Baraev]: 'We are acting on orders from the supreme military emir. Our supreme military emir there is Shamil Basaev. You know him very well. And Maskhadov is our president.'» («Russian NTV shows…,» BBC Monitoring Service, 26 October 2002. (87) Mark Franchetti, «Dream of Martyrdom,» «The Sunday Times,» 27 October 2002. (88) «Gibel zalozhnikov -- rezultat oshibki spetsluzhb?» «Moskovskii komsomolets,» 28 October 2002. (89) Anna Politkovskaya, «My Hours Inside the Moscow Theater,» Institute for War and Peace Reporting, No. 153, 31 October 2002. (90) Valerii Vyzhutovich, «Usyplayuyushchii gaz,» «Moskovskie novosti,» 29 October 2002. (91) Anna Politkovskaya, «Tsena razgovorov,» «Novaya Gazeta,» No. 80, 28 October 2002. Views: 9204 |
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